Having completed the IMF Program of Structural Adjustment, the Moroccan government put together an emergence plan that designates the most promising areas of economic growth (Agoumi & Benmansour, 2006). However, it seems that the recommendations of the report were ahead of the infrastructural readiness of the country to support economic take-off. During a period of ten years, large investments were undertaken to improve physical infrastructure, upgrade telecommunication, and introduce institutional reforms that increase Morocco’s attractiveness to international investors.
The ten years lag between the late 90s governmental emergence plan recommendations, and the renewed 2005 commitment to this strategy based on the study conducted by McKinsey consultancy (Bergh, 2006) of Competitive Morocco (LaVie Economique, 2006) could be attributed to the need to lay adequate groundwork for the new vision of development to materialize. Morocco’s new emergence strategy centers around consolidating its know-how in classical industries such as food industry, fisheries, textile, chemical industry, pharmaceutical industry, and tourism while building a competitive advantage in high added-value niches such as off-shoring especially to French and Spanish speaking countries, automotive low-cost industry, aeronautics, and specialized electronics. (Agoumi & Benmansour, 2006).
The national leadership vision about the catalyzing role of knowledge intensive industries has crystallized around the concept of creative industrial clusters built to optimize regional human and physical advantage in an export driven economy (The Mitchell Group, 2003). In this regard, “Electronic City” and “Automotive City” in Tangier are the two most recent cluster concepts that build on the 14 kilometers proximity to Europe and the modern facilities of Tangier-Med port, one of the 15 largest ports in the world. The “Aeronautic City” in Casablanca is an export oriented hub that hosts national and international ventures intent on upgrading Morocco’s contribution from a parts’ outsourcer to a manufacturer of entire aeronautic systems (La Vie Eco, 2007). The expected revenue from aeronautic industry by 2012 is around 15 billion Dirhams (roughly more than two billion U.S dollars). In addition to these two cities, the Food Industry clusters in Meknes-Fez and Al-Gharb (respectively located on the North East and North West) were also set up to optimize natural assets of these fertile regions in organic, processed, and pre-cooked food. Finally, Agadir, on the southern part of the Atlantic Ocean has the natural, infrastructural, and human endowments to maximize the competitive advantage of Morocco in the fishing and sea-food processing industry.
Notwithstanding the promising potential of the Moroccan emergence plan, clear commitment to investment in Genetics, Nanotechnology, and robotics at least in the form of collaboration between the government, research institutes, and investors is at its embryonic stage. According to Le Matin (2006), officials aim to attract Moroccan expatriate engineers and multinational firms to launch nanotechnology, micro-technology, and biotechnology ventures in collaboration with existing universities and research institutes. In this respect, some government leaders are aware of the urgency of jumping on board of high technology before this historic window of opportunity closes as well. Therefore, they set a deadline of two years for establishing these centers in the technological cluster in Rabat-Sale. Hopefully, the increasing attractiveness of Morocco in areas as pharmaceuticals, high-tech electronic, and aeronautics could be the gateway to research and development in genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics as they apply to these respective industries.
While taking stock of the sense of urgency that some Moroccan officials have demonstrated at least in their public interviews (Le Matin, 2006) regarding high tech investment, I hope that the political and the business leadership has a strategic appreciation of the real national gain from true commitment to the diffusion of cutting-edge genetics, nanotechnology, nuclear technology, and robotics. I believe that if government policy relies exclusively on international investors to develop only aspects of these technologies that are relevant to the exports, the technological spillover might not be relevant to long-term national development goals. In this respect, as a developing country, Moroccan human development is contingent on facing the following challenges:
1. Energy storage, production, and conversion
2. Agricultural productivity enhancement
3. Water treatment and remediation
4. Disease diagnosis and screening
5. Drug delivery systems
6. Food processing and storage
7. Air pollution and remediation
8. Construction
9. Health monitoring
10. Vector and pest detection and control
(Singer, Buentello, and Daar, 2005, p. 58)
If in the short run the government focus is on providing incentives to high technologies to be established in Morocco, my contention is that without a clear national and hopefully regional strategic vision of the relevance of these technologies for national and regional development, the potential dividend of such adoption will only be restricted to a new small elite whose prosperity depends on replicating exogenously conceptualized specs instead of endogenously creating their own concepts and designs.
The most pressing lesson that Morocco, and for that matter, all developing countries must learn is that being an outsource destination is certainly a step towards growth, but if the country does not have the intellectual and human endowments to be an additive transformer instead of a low cost mass replicator, this advantage will soon erode. For this reason, a strategic vision that is committed to innovation is of utmost importance for Morocco’s future viability. In this respect, clear national commitment, and intelligent use of incentives to leverage investment in genetics, nanotechnology, nuclear technology, and robotics as they apply to the above fields will galvanize support for public and private research institutions which work on things that make money, but most importantly, on things that matter to local and regional human development.
Finally, in addition to the national public and private effort, the huge financial and human resources that need to be committed for these projects are probably far beyond what a country on the mid-low income bracket could afford. And given that FDI (foreign direct investment) might not always be motivated by local human development, South-South cooperation, is vital for pooling the funds and the brains for high technology for local human development. In the face of a powerful European Union that invests billions of Euros on nanotechnology centers, and an equally massive investment in huge blocs such as North America, China and India (El Naschie, 2006), minuscule players such as Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt must consolidate their disparate initiatives in high technology investment especially given that their challenges are almost identical. Creating poles of specialization in each of these six countries with free circulation of funds, brains, equitable distribution of dividend is ideally the most cost effective way of indigenizing knowledge production in high technology and transforming from low cost information sweatshops into wealth generating sustainable knowledge powerhouses.
Knowledge production and the Moroccan education system
Contrasting the grand goals for bolstering knowledge economy with the general low performance of the Moroccan educational and training system (World Bank, 2006, 2008) begs fundamental questions on what could spur sustainable growth in Morocco: Is it more aggressive investment that results in professional development and training and therefore more skilled workers, or should higher education professional and academic institutes take the lead in preparing qualified resources for investment to expand? The examination of The World Bank (2006) Country Economic Memorandum and the findings of the 2007 World Economic Forum ranking of the most competitive countries emphasize that growth is premised on the development of at least average standards in three overarching categories: Basic requirements, efficiency enhancers, and innovation enhancers. These three categories include nine pillars: Institutions, infrastructure, macro-economy, health and primary education, higher education and training, market efficiency, technological readiness, business sophistication, and innovation. Having said this, The World Bank (2006) insists that one of the challenges of the growth puzzle lies in the dimensionality of growth dynamics as they vary from one country to another. In this regard, the World Bank (2006) refers to the Morocco case as a growth enigma as it has failed to achieve high growth even if its natural, financial, institutional, and macro-economic infrastructure predicts otherwise. The World Economic Forum (2007) Competitiveness Report shows the following factors as the top inhibitors of a competitive economy:
If this URL: http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gcr/africa/morocco.pdf does not work, please read the document attached in the Uploads section entitled Morocco competitiveness profile. (World Economic Forum, 2007, p. 160)
Both the World Bank (2006) and The World Economic Forum (2007) Competitiveness Report agree that the constraints to fast economic growth in Morocco are numerous. Given the scope of this paper on how innovative knowledge production could be leveraged to leap-frog Morocco to the exponential growth of knowledge economy, the goal of elaborating on the interrelated factors slowing national development is to recognize that sustainable change should be based on a diagnostic and integrated approach that seeks sector-specific solutions, but without losing sight of the national big picture of where Morocco needs to be in order to live up to the economic, environmental, health, and cultural challenges of the future.
The above chart illustrates how the lack of financing especially through foreign direct investment can be a direct consequence of tax policies, lack of infrastructure, corruption, and inadequately trained labor force. In this regard, World Bank (2006) ranks Morocco amongst the countries where business offers the least training, which therefore affects the country’s capacity to compete and innovate. As I had explained, Moroccan officials have put together an Emergence Plan that focuses on knowledge-intensive and export oriented high added value enterprises as the key to sustainable high growth, and job creation. In this regard, even if private investment and Foreign Direct Investment is increasingly more attracted to Morocco, ensuring the sustainability and the scale up of knowledge economy is predicated on an abundant and skilled workforce that is attractive at home and abroad.
Business firms’ investment can be a prime opportunity for the development of knowledge capital through knowledge spill-over and learning by doing (World Bank, 2006). In this respect, some companies do provide high tech training opportunities to entry level job seekers in Morocco (Conjoncture, 2005). However, I am not sure of the extent to which the Moroccan government provides for incentives to foreign and local firms to incorporate advanced and continuing training for job-seekers especially in knowledge intensive industries. As it is now, on a scale of one to seven, the Moroccan score according to the World Economic Forum Competitiveness Report (2007) is 6.1 in primary education and health, 3.5 in higher education and training, 3.3 in technological readiness, and 3.3 in innovation. At this level, Morocco’s competitive advantage will be limited to its low cost labor and it geographical proximity to Europe. None of these advantages is robust enough in view of the availability of much cheaper labor in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the immense advantage of countries such as China and India in the skilled workers who are able and eager to do the same work at a much lower wage. With these threats, it seems that the only option for Morocco is to consolidate its natural geographical, multi-linguistic, and cultural advantages, while investing aggressively in the massive training of knowledge economy workers. One way of preparing these workers is by aligning its highly inefficient and low quality educational system with the demands of the knowledge production age.
The World Bank (2008) Flagship Report on education in MENA classifies Morocco as a low performer in the integrated index of access, equity, efficiency, and quality. The characteristics of low performers, according to the report, are low levels of primary completion rate, low access to higher education and also high illiteracy rates. The effort to fill the existing gaps in access and equity has a times resulted in low efficiency and low quality. To address this educational lag, the World Bank recommends more effective results-driven engineering that upgrades physical resources, curriculum, teaching, finance and administration. It also calls for well targeted incentives that foster evaluation and monitoring of education performance and the alignment of this education with market needs. Finally, the report underscores political accountability to give voice to stake holders at the national and local levels.
Borrowing the World Bank (2006) Country Economic Memorandum observation that “Reforms are important, but rapid growth relies more fundamentally on properly identifying the binding constraints to growth” (World Bank, 2006, p. i), it is important to note that the successful reform that the 2008 report seems to promise is unlikely to materialize without a paradigm-shift that does not only see reform as a reaction to educational structural deficiencies, but also as a configuration of the system to be more responsive to future demands. In other words, given that technological innovation and educational reforms seem to move at discrepant speeds, it is important to diagnose the educational system constraints that do not only prevent access, equity, quality, and efficiency, but also identify the constraints for a continually innovative educational system that is fully capable of producing tomorrow’s future workers.
Notwithstanding the fact that national education is a strategic sector, the government should probably frame-shift from blanket reform designs where it is the only architect into encouraging parallel alternatives of education provision that promote innovation since pre-school. In this regard, the focus should be on nurturing a culture of creativity, intellectual freedom, freedom of initiative and innovation in every formal, informal, and non-formal education context in the country. In this regard, one of the limitations of the World Bank (2008) report, and arguably other reports is the disproportionate emphasis on successful educational reform as it takes place within formal schooling contexts, and failure to explore how out-of-school factors can probably have more influence in nurturing learners/students/researchers with a disposition for life long learning. In this respect, I believe that one of the benefits of a research driven educational system is that it will democratize dialogue about education innovation by creating a critical mass of experts who could initiate endogenous change, and who have the disposition to be at the forefront of early but discerning adopters of relevant innovation. In a nutshell, without a culture that encourages people to think for themselves and take ownership of their victories and setbacks, it is hard to imagine Morocco transform to an innovative society that takes its progress in its own hands.
Looking ahead: A great history is great, how about a great future?
In my future posts, my focus will be on innovative education reform for a knowledge producing society. I will draw on the literature of the LeapFrog Institutes, Harkins and Kubik (2006), Verna Allee (2003), class discussions, and other articles and slides to suggest some guidelines for what a creative Moroccan knowledge producing society could look like.